Humans are remarkable moral evaluators. However, between infancy and the preschool-age, children move from merely evaluating the world in terms of moral (“good”/“bad”) terms to acting upon it in meaningful (prosocial and antisocial) ways. We argue that children developing understanding and experience of choice and agency has profound behavioral consequences for this development in prosocial behavior. During the preschool age, children begin to explicitly reflect on their own actions and alternative actions (i.e., actions not taken), which then in turn help them make sense of the extent to which their prosocial behavior is costly, freely chosen, and internally motivated. We review the progression and developmental antecedents of children beliefs about choice and agency as well as recent evidence for how childrens social contexts may imbue them with a sense of choice and agency over their moral actions. We argue that the preschool period may be a particularly sensitive developmental time window during which children are sensitive to input regarding their own agency.

This inclination is also shared by very young children. Even infants are able to distinguish between those who harm and those who help others, preferring the latter over the former [1]. By the early preschool ages, children make those evaluations explicitly known through words such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ [2], and through their verbal and behavioral protests when others do not accord with social norms [3,4].

We argue that even more striking, however, is our ability to move from mere evaluators to full-fledged moral agents, capable of changing the world to become not what it is, but also what it ‘ought’ to be. This ability emerges initially as non-conscious and non-reflective prosocial behavior: Between the first and second year of life, children move from recognizing that others have intentions and goals [5,6] to helping others fulfill and enact those goals [7]. Similarly, children move from empathizing with those in distress or being content with observing people helping [8] to actively rectifying that distress through offering their own tools, resources, and comfort [9**,10]. Thus, infants and young children not only judge what ought to happen but actively ensure that it does.

During the preschool years, children acquire the ability to reflect on actions in a new way, and we argue that this in turn has important behavioral consequences. Around the ages of 4–5, children start to explicitly articulate beliefs about possible and impossible events [11] and, relatedly, possible and impossible human actions [12**]. This emerging understanding of freedom of choice, which continues to develop into school-age, likely rests on more general abilities for counterfactual [13**] and future thinking [14]. Peter may have established a habit of drinking milk every day for breakfast, but he is certainly capable of choosing to drink orange juice. Alice may have wanted to play with trains today, but she could have effectuated a different outcome and played with Legos instead. In short, in scenarios involving human actions, children not only consider what occurred in this world, but articulate beliefs about alternative possible worlds, as long as those worlds are ‘near’ in the sense that they do not violate the physical and epistemic laws of ours [15], though see also [16] for alternative developmental accounts.

Critically, these developments have consequences for how young children think about their own actions. Just as children become able to imagine that events in the world could have been different from how they turned out
(e.g., ‘my room could have been clean instead of messy today’), they can imagine how their own actions could have been different as well (‘I could have made my room clean instead of messy’). As a result, children not only consider causes, effects, and alternative realities, but also place themselves as the causes of their own effects, capable of creating their own alternative realities. For example, by four years of age, a child will make a drawing, but then reflect that she did not have to draw that, and could have in fact drawn something else instead [12**,17]. As they do for others’ actions, children appreciate that they themselves could have desired other things, drawn different shapes, effectuated alternative outcomes, so long as those outcomes follow the laws of the physical world. For example, children appreciate that they can take a different path to go to school than the one they habitually take, but not if doing so meant they would have to walk through a brick wall (physical impossibility; [18]) or if they do not know about the other path (epistemic impossibility; [12**,19**]).

Finally, as part of this ability to construe their own actions as choices, children begin to recognize conflicting motives for the choices that they and others make. For example, they can appreciate conflicts between external motivations for behavior (e.g., moral and social norms) and internal ones (e.g., desires; [17,19**]). They can reflect on conflicting internal motives as well; wanting one thing but choosing another [12**] or wanting two things at once [20].

Along with considering conflicting motivations comes an ability to experience choices as costly; that is, to experience and construe actions which benefit others in light of possible alternatives that would have benefited the self. In recent work, we have argued that the practice of making costly choices helps us situate ourselves more broadly as agents of change that are able to effectuate positive moral outcomes rather than just passively observing them. For example, in one recent study [9**], preschoolers had an opportunity to effectuate kindness by giving up a sticker of theirs to make another agent (a puppet) feel better. We gave children varying amounts of agency (see Figure 1) in how they effectuated that kindness. One group of children was given no agency at all; another group was given minimal agency (told they could do the nice thing and give it to the puppet or hand it back to the experimenter to put away so that no one receives it). This group of children had some choice over the eventual outcome, but the choice that did not involve kindness was not a very good one. Finally, one last group of children — the focal experimental group — was given a difficult and costly choice, and thus the greatest amount of agency — they were told that they could either do the nice thing and make the puppet feel better by giving it a sticker or they could keep the sticker all for themselves. This group had a choice of kindness, but also clear evidence that kindness was not the only option — had they chosen to, they could have produced a selfish outcome instead.

Almost all children in all three groups ended up doing the kind thing of giving up that sticker to the puppet. But, what varied was what happened next: in a subsequent step, children were given an opportunity to engage in a

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**Figure 1**

Schematic of materials and procedure from Cherynay and Kushnir [9**]. In Step 1, children were introduced to a puppet who was feeling sad. In Step 2, children were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a Costly Choice Condition group that was told they could keep the sticker for themselves or give it to the puppet, a Noncostly Choice Condition group that was told they could have the experimenter put the sticker away or give it to the puppet, or a No Choice Condition group that was told they had to give the sticker to the puppet. In Step 3, all children were introduced to a new puppet, given three more stickers, and told they could split the stickers however they wished between themselves and the new puppet.
new kind act toward a new individual — they were given three more shiny stickers and told they could either keep all of them or they could share some with yet another puppet that was feeling sad. The group that was initially given full agency over their decisions (a choice of kindness with a very appealing alternative of selfishness) was the one most generous toward the new individual.

Having initial ability to freely choose their own prosocial actions facilitated children’s ability to make similar costly prosocial decisions again. Those initial costly decisions, as compared with not so costly decisions or actions that were not decisions at all, may have felt more internally motivating to preschool-aged children [21]. One possibility for why this may be the case is that having that initial choice helped children construe their own actions in a different light — in being able to experience the temptation of the alternative and actively choose against it, children may be forming, at least implicitly, ideas about the kinds of people they are, or the types of people they prefer to be. Seeing not only the causal impact of their actions, but also understanding the cost and sacrifice of that causal impact may help children feel particularly responsible for their prosocial behavior. Similarly, children’s understanding of their own causal agency for negative actions fuels their guilt and responsibility for those negative outcomes [22,23]. For example, toddlers work harder to repair a broken toy when they believe that their actions caused the toy to break. Thus, the more causal impact children view themselves as having, the more they may construe their own actions, and the more likely they are to continue acting prosocially (either to repair negative actions or propel positive actions that they themselves had caused) in the future. In fact, work with adults suggests a prosocial construal feedback loop: in making difficult choices, people construe themselves as being good people, thus propelling future prosocial behavior [24**].

The idea that kindness begets kindness is not new: the experience of being prosocial helps children be prosocial again [25]. But, importantly, not all experiences are the same — like adults, children appear to evaluate their own actions in the contexts in which they occur. Other work has shown that children’s prosocial behavior increases after experiences with actions that are particularly costly: children become more subsequently prosocial after performing prosocial actions that were not rewarded with prizes [26] after performing actions that come at a proportional cost (i.e., after giving 100% of their resources versus just 25%; [27]), or after making the action in private [25]. Thus, the surrounding context in which children undertake their prosocial actions offers cues to help children interpret these actions. For example, when children act in private, they might believe that those actions must have been made independent of external influences such as watchful parents or experimenters. Similarly, when children undertake actions that are not rewarded materially, children appreciate that their actions are motivated intrinsically rather than extrinsically. Finally, when children expend high material costs to undertake their actions, they may come to believe that those actions were particularly desirable or necessary.

Children are also sensitive to how others react to their actions. For example, children are more prosocial after an adult labels their prosocial action as being internally motivated [28], after an adult labels the helpfulness of the person, rather than the helpfulness of the action [29**], or even after the mere recollection of having done something particularly nice in the past [30]. The last of these suggests that not only do children use adults’ cues for how to interpret their prosocial acts, but that they themselves start to attach meaning and interpretations to their actions. The totality of this work suggests that prosocial identities are constructed not only through the actions children take, but also through the ways adults discuss such actions, and through the way children ultimately interpret them.

**Conclusion**

The preschool age may also be a particularly important developmental time window during which agentive experiences have downstream consequences for their behavior. While preschool-aged children are confident in their abilities to have effectuated different physical outcomes (e.g. drawn a circle instead of a square), children’s tendency to state that they are able to effectuate different moral and social outcomes is contextually, developmentally, and culturally sensitive [17,19**]. The fact that children attend to, accept, and ultimately use adults’ interpretations of their actions suggests that parenting and culture may play a strong role in shaping children’s beliefs about early prosocial behavior. Future work may further explore this avenue by focusing on how different cultural contexts attach different meanings to the same prosocial behavior, and the consequences that such different meanings have on children’s subsequent behavior. Thus, as with adults [31,32] morality constrains what children believe is possible [33*]. Because culture, parenting, and one’s social context more generally eventually shape how children interpret their own agency, adults can also be agents of change in young children’s lives. Imbuing children with agency when they make prosocial actions need not be solely the role of the child or the situation — adults and relevant others are able to provide opportunities for children to actively choose to do the right thing, label their options in ways that allow children to recognize their own agency, and scaffold choice constructively — all of which eventually help children recognize their own behavioral impact on the world.

**Conflict of interest statement**

Nothing declared.
References and recommended reading

Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

- of special interest
- of outstanding interest


This paper demonstrated that even adults’ beliefs about what is possible is constrained by what is morally permissible. Across three studies, adults judged possibility for impossible, improbable, and morally wrong events under cognitive load or under reflective, non-load conditions. Adults under cognitive load were more likely to judge that immoral events were also impossible, suggesting that morality constrains even adults’ sense of possibility and agency.